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DONALD J. RALEIGH
CO-OPTATION AMID REPRESSION
The Revolutionary Communists in Saratov province
1918-1920
REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNISTS? Few historians appear to know of them; not a single
Western, Soviet, or Russian study focuses exclusively on the party.1 Leonard
Schapiro devotes a page to the Revolutionary Communists (RCs) in his classic
work on the period; however, Orlando Figess monograph on the Volga
1. The fullest discussions of the party I have found are in the works of Iu. I. Shestak,
Bolsheviki i levye techeniia melkoburzhuaznoi demokratii (Moscow, 1974); id., Taktika
bolshevikov po otnosheniiu k partii levykh eserov i otkolovshimsia ot nee partiiam
revoliutsionnykh kommunistov i narodnikov-kommunistov (Moscow, 1971); id.,
Vzaimootnosheniia bolshevikov s levymi melkoburzhuaznymi partiiami i gruppami v gody
grazhdanskoi voiny, in I. I. Mints, ed., Bankrotstvo melkoburzhuaznykh partii Rossii 1917-
1922 gg. (Moscow, 1977): 126-136; and id., Bankrotstvo partii Revoliutsionnykh
kommunistov v Povolzhe, Povolzhskii krai, 4 (1975): 24-38. A chapter in M. V. Spirinas
Krakh melkoburzhuaznoi kontseptsii sotsializma eserov (Moscow, 1987), discusses the partys
evolution toward Bolshevism, but is based on a limited source base and, like the studies by
Shestak, says little about the specific historical and geographical contexts in which the party
emerged in Saratov. Only the briefest mention of the party can be found in standard Soviet
works such as K. V. Gusevs Krakh partii levykh eserov (Moscow, 1963). Before 1994, the one
attempt to assess the partys role in Saratov province during the Civil War was a short,
tendentious essay by M. Sagradian, Iz istorii vozniknoveniia odnopartiinoi sistemy v
Sovetskoi respublike, in Istoriia partiinykh organizatsii Povolzhia (Mezhvuzovskii nauchnyi
sbornik) (Saratov, 1973), vyp. 1: 108-123. The crudest Soviet representation of the party is
found in Ocherki istorii Saratovskoi partiinoi organizatsii KPSS, Pt. 2, 1918-1937 (Saratov,
1965): 107. A post-Soviet attempt to illuminate the partys role is found in Iu. P. Suslovs
Sotsialisticheskie partii i krestianstvo Povolzhia (oktiabr 1917-1920) (Saratov, 1994).
I wish to thank Z. E. Gusakova and her staff at the Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Saratovskoi oblasti,
and the archivists at Tsentr dokumentatsii noveishei istorii Saratovskoi oblasti. I am grateful to
N. I. Deviataikina and Jonathan Wallace for their comments on an earlier version of this work. I
also would like to acknowledge the financial support of the International Research and
Exchanges Board (IREX) and the University of North Carolina Research Council, which
helped make my research possible.
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countryside and Vladimir Brovkins Behind the front lines of the Civil War do not
mention them at all.2
 
 The few Soviet historians who acknowledged the existence of
the Revolutionary Communists dismissed them as a group of former Left SRs who
broke with the party in July 1918 after the murder of the German ambassador,
Count Mirbach, in order to form a separate party that September, which eventually
collapsed under the weight of its own ideological contradictions. While such an
interpretation is not devoid of merit, it offers but a crude representation of a
fascinating and important political phenomenon. From late 1918 until October
1920 the Revolutionary Communists participated in the ruling coalition in Saratov
province, attracting a considerable following in several key districts and 
 
uezd
 
towns, as well as elsewhere in the Urals and Volga regions. Perhaps the most
important supplier of grain to the urban centers of the Communist-controlled
heartland, front-line Saratov province remained Red throughout the Civil War,
owing to the hybrid form of left-socialist radicalism that had emerged there, of
which Revolutionary Communism constituted an integral part. Drawing on
recently opened archives, I seek to restore this influential but unknown party to the
historical record, to clarify the Revolutionary Communist Partys contribution to
the survival of Soviet power, its relationship to Bolshevism, and the reasons for the
partys ultimate decline in 1920.
 
3
 
2. Leonard Schapiro, 
 
The origin of the Communist autocracy: Political opposition in the Soviet
state. First phase, 1917-1922, 
 
2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1977): 180-181; Orlando Figes, 
 
Peasant
Russia Civil War: The Volga countryside in revolution, 1917-1921
 
 (Oxford, 1989); Vladimir
N. Brovkin, 
 
Behind the front lines of the Civil War: Political parties and social movements in
Russia, 1918-1922
 
 (Princeton, 1994). In fact, none of the recent studies on the Civil War
mentions the Revolutionary Communists. The party enjoyed popularity in Moscow, but
Richard Sakwa does not discuss them in his 
 
Soviet Communists in power: A study of Moscow
during the Civil War, 1918-1921
 
 (Hampshire, 1988), nor does Ettore Cinnella in The tragedy
of the Russian Revolution: Promise and default of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries in 1918,
 
Cahiers du Monde russe,
 
 38, 1-2 (1997): 45-82.
3. Before the stunning changes in the former Soviet Union revolutionized scholars access to
sources earlier off-limits, Western historians had already began to reassessand in some cases
examine in depth for the first timethe role of the Bolsheviks socialist opponents (and allies)
both before and after the great divide of 1917. For the Socialist Revolutionaries, I have in mind
the writings of Michael Melancon, especially his 
 
The Socialist Revolutionaries and the
Russian anti-war movement, 1914-1917
 
 (Columbus, 1990); id, Athens or Babylon?: The birth
and development of the Revolutionary Parties in Saratov, 1890-1905, in R. Wade and S.
Seregny, eds, 
 
Politics and society in provincial Russia: Saratov, 1590-1917
 
 (Columbus, 1989):
73-112; id., Marching together ! Left bloc activitiess in the Russian Revolutionary
Movement, 1900 to February 1917, 
 
Slavic Review,
 
 49, 2 (Summer 1990): 239-252; id. The
Socialist Revolutionaries from 1902 to 1907: Peasant 
 
and
 
 workers Party, 
 
Russian History
 
 ,
12, 1 (1985): 2-47; id., Stormy petrels: The Socialist Revolutionaries in Russias legal labor
organizations, 1905-1914, 
 
The Carl Beck Papers
 
, 703 (June 1988); id., Who wrote what and
when? The proclamations of the February Revolution, 
 
Soviet Studies,
 
 40, 3 (1988): 479-500;
M. Hildermeier, 
 
Die Sozialrevolutionäre Partei Russlands: Agrarsozialismus und
Modernisierung im Zarenreich
 
 (Cologne and Vienna, 1978); Christopher Rice, 
 
Russian
workers and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party through the Revolution of 1905-1907
 
 (New
York, 1988). Vladimir Brovkin has done the most to question the literature on Russias
Mensheviks. See his 
 
The Mensheviks after October: Socialist opposition and the rise of the
Bolshevik dictatorship
 
 (Ithaca and London, 1987); id., ed. and tr., 
 
Dear comrades: Menshevik
reports on the Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War
 
 (Stanford, 1991); id., The Mensheviks
under attack: The transformation of Soviet politics, June-September 1918, 
 
Jahrbücher für 
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Contemporary social theory suggests ways in which societies control their
subjects not only by imposing constraints, but also by co-opting their subjects
strategies of dissent, thus predetermining how they rebel against these constraints.
 
4
 
Indeed, because the Bolsheviks relied heavily on what Michael Mann calls the
despotic power of the state
 
5
 
 in order to effect the changes they believed they had the
moral right to introduce into Russia, they readily resorted to repression and likewise
sought to manipulate the dominant discourse in which politics were played out. In
either case they often selectively drew on their opponents policies. The resulting
dynamic of co-optation amid repression became a characteristic Bolshevik practice
during the period and a key element of the formative experience of Civil War for all
involved. Thus, this case study of the partys relationship toward its populist ally
offers valuable insights into how the Bolsheviks exercised state power in general.
 
The Saratov Left SRs
 
The Revolutionary Communists emerged from the radical wing of the SR Party, the
Left SRs.
 
6
 
 In considering the role of the latter in Saratov, we see that a left socialist
bloc had formed locally before 1917. During the revolution, it took on new
significance as social polarization undermined hopes for a peaceful solution to
Russias political impasse. The October 1917 events led to a formal split in the
Socialist Revolutionary Party as its left wing joined the Lenin government. In
Saratov province the Bolshevik-Left SR bloc contributed singularly to the spread
and consolidation of Soviet power in 1918, especially at the district level, where a
radical populist tradition had been in the making since the turn of the century.
 
7
 
 
 
4. Gerald Graff, Co-optation, in H. Aram Veeser, ed., 
 
The new historicism
 
 (New York,
1989): 168-169. This idea owes a good deal to the work of Michel Foucault, who investigated
how power tends to organize and channel dissent, rather than repress it. See his 
 
The history of
sexuality, 
 
vol. I, 
 
An introduction,
 
 trans. Richard Hurley (New York, 1978): 17-49. 
5.  That is, the range of actions which the elite is experienced to undertake without routine,
institutionalized negotiations with civil society groups. See Michael Mann, The Autonomous
power of the state: Its origins, mechanisms and results, in 
 
States in history
 
 (Oxford, 1986): 112.
6.  Michael Melancon argues that the Left SRs were not a radical offshoot of the SR Party, but
the main current within it. See Left SR proclamations, 1914-1919: Speaking Left SR,
presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic
Studies (AAASS), Seattle, Nov. 21, 1992.
7.  See chapter 8 of my 
 
Revolution on the Volga: 1917 in Saratov
 
 (Ithaca, 1986): 292-320.
Geschichte Osteuropas, 32 (1984): 378-391; and id., Workers unrest and the Bolsheviks
(sic) response in 1919, Slavic Review, 49, 3 (1990): 350-373.
But apart from Iu. G. Felshtinskiis, Lutz Hafners, and Ettore Cinnellas published studies
and work in progress by Michael Melancon and Sally Boniece on the Left SRs during the Civil
War, there has been no attempt since Oliver Radkeys 1963 volume on the early months of
Soviet rule to look closely at the Socialist Revolutionaries after the October Revolution. See Iu.
G. Felshtinskii, Bolsheviki i levye esery, oktiabr 1917-iiul 1918: Na puti k odnopartiinoi
diktature (Paris, 1985) ; L. Hafner, Die Partie der Linken Sozialrevolutionäre in der Russischen
Revolution von 1917/18 (Koln, 1994), and O. Radkey, The sickle under the hammer: The
Russian Socialist Revolutionaries in the early months of Soviet rule (New York, 1963).
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The Left SR Party programpublished, incidentally, by the Saratov Soviet
made them a valuable, even essential ally of the Bolsheviks. Viewing themselves as
one of the divisions in the army of international socialism, the Left SRs
considered the industrial proletariat, the toiling peasant majority, and the
revolutionary-socialist intelligentsia the three component parts of the exploited
population whose task was to emancipate itself through social revolution. The party
advocated establishment of a dictatorship of all toiling people, the extension of
voting rights only to toilers (
 
tsenz truda
 
), repression of the exploiting classes, and a
free federation of Soviet republics. Like Lenin, the Left SR leaders believed the
Constituent Assembly should not be allowed to supplant Soviet power, whose
survival rested with the fate of the Bolsheviks. Convinced they were in the best
position to influence Bolshevik policies in regard to Russias peasant majority, they
accepted portfolios in the Lenin government while in the provinces they supported
the transfer of executive power to local soviets.
 
8
 
To be sure, the Left SRs faith in the subjective forces of history, such as
personality and individualism, and their belief that ethical considerations were as
important as economic factors distanced them from the Marxists. While these
orientations affected its policies and practices, the Saratov Left SR organization
remained committed to class war, to revolution, and to Soviet power, especially as
it faced growing opposition from both moderate socialists and the Whites.
 
9
 
 As a
result, the potent alliance in Saratov even weathered the controversy over the Brest-
Litovsk peace that poisoned relations between the two parties central committees
early in 1918, after which the Left SRs withdrew from the 
 
Sovnarkom
 
 in protest.
The Left SRs, like the Bolsheviks, were similarly divided over Lenins foreign
policy, and in Saratov both party organizations initially railed against the peace
treaty.
 
10
 
 
The common ground both local party organizations found regarding the
disputed treaty strengthened the left-socialist bloc in Saratov, as Left SR activists,
arriving from Poltava and Kharkov, carried out party work at the district and 
 
volost
 
level. Moreover, the Left SRs backing of the Bolsheviks during elections to the
Saratov Soviet in April 1918 kept the elections from being a rout for Lenins party,
for this support came just as the Bolsheviks relations with Right SRs and
 
8. Partiia levykh sotsialistov-revoliutsionerov (internatsionalistov), 
 
Programma i ustav partii
levykh sotsialistov-revoliutsionerov
 
 
 
(internatsionalistov)
 
 (Saratov, 1918): 5-9. See also the
statement by Ustinov regarding the class basis of the party found in 
 
Znamia revoliutsii
 
, 4, 96
(Nov. 29, 1918): 3.
9. Partiia levykh sotsialistov-revoliutsionerov (internatsionalistov), 
 
Materialy po peresmotru
partiinoi programmy
 
, vol. 3, 
 
Sbornik statei po peresmotru programmy
 
 (Moscow, 1918). 
10. See chapter 3 of my forthcoming study, 
 
Experiencing Civil War: Politics, society, and
revolutionary culture on the Volga. Saratov, 1918-1922
 
. For a discussion of the emergence of
the Left SRs in Saratov see the remarks of Ezhov at the First Party Congress. 
 
Protokoly pervogo
sezda partii levykh sotsialistov-revoliutsionerov (internatsionalistov)
 
 (Moscow, 1918): 9.
Articles published in the newspaper 
 
Znamia truda
 
 and later as a separate anthology observe that
the partys maximum program complemented that of the Bolsheviks. For rifts within the Left
SR leadership see E. Cinnella, 
 
art. cit.
 
: 62-63. 
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Mensheviks deteriorated further. Taking advantage of economic dislocation and
food shortages to galvanize opposition to the new order, these groups decried the
Bolsheviks shutting down of the opposition press and Constituent Assembly.
 
11
 
Meanwhile, conflict flaring up within the Left SR Party leadership over tactics,
often exacerbated by personal rivalries, presaged the breakup of the party in the
summer of 1918. These developments found resonance along the Volga after
another influx of outsiders appeared in town. Comprised mainly of workers, the
Saratov Left SR organization had lacked leaders of national stature until May,
when, in the wake of the partys second congress, M. G. Markariants, V. Chernyi,
A. M. Ustinov, P. F. Sapozhnikov, and others traveled to Saratov to set up a Volga
regional party center for the expressed purpose of uniting those who opposed the
Central Committees destructive tactics aimed at undermining the Brest-Litovsk
peace. (At this time Ustinov was already proposing that the Left SRs rename
themselves Communist-Socialists in order to link themselves more closely with the
Bolsheviks and separate themselves from the parent SR Party.) Saratov offered a
favorable atmosphere, for the local Left SR organization, like those in Kazan,
Penza, Ufa, and elsewhere in the region, had come to protest the revolutionary
fantasy and political emotionalism of the partys Central Committee.
 
12
 
 In their
own estimation, Saratov Left SRs believed the relationship with the Leninists
remained excellent. During an anti-Bolshevik uprising that broke out in Saratov
in mid-May 1918
 
13
 
, an armed guard of Left SRs from Kharkhov rose to the soviets
defense; more than half of the delegates to a provincial peasant congress in May
were Left SRs, and luminaries such as Ustinov and Sapozhnikov sat on the
congress presidium.
 
14
 
 
Other threats to Soviet power followed hard on the heels of the May uprising, as
a result of which the Saratov Soviet expelled its socialist opposition (but not the
Left SRs) 
 
before
 
 the Central Executive Committee took similar steps. The success
of local Left SRs in the Saratov countryside, however, appears to have caused
growing concern within the Bolshevik organization which, at the end of June,
resolved to break off joint agitation work with the populists. This took place on the
eve of the introduction of the Bolsheviks brutal grain requisition policies and
related measures, which the Left SRs protested. Relations between the parties at the
local level were thus beginning to show the first signs of strain when news of the
assassination of Count Mirbach in the capital in conjunction with the start of the
Fifth Congress of Soviets, generally cited as the opening salvo in the so-called Left
SR uprising, reached Saratov in early July 1918.
 
11. 
 
Znamia revoliutsii 
 
reported that the Left SRs received as many votes as the Right SRs. See
 
Znamia revoliutsii, 
 
3, 95 (Nov. 7, 1918): 4.
12. Partiia levykh sotsialistov-revoliutsionerov (internatsionalistov), 
 
Vokrug moskovskikh
iiulskikh sobytii: Sbornik statei
 
 (Saratov, 1918).
13.  See my Languages of power: How the Saratov Bolsheviks imagined their enemies,
 
Slavic Review,
 
 57, 2 (1998): 320-349.
14. 
 
Znamia revoliutsii
 
, 3, 95 (Nov.7, 1918): 4.
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Reactions to the Left SR uprising
 
A growing lack of harmony between the Bolsheviks and Left SR leadership
determined the tone of the Fifth Congress of Soviets that convened on July 4, which
included 678 Communist and 269 Left SR delegates. Prominent Left SRs Mariia
Spiridonova and B. D. Kamkov obstreperously challenged key Bolshevik strategies
regarding the Brest-Litovsk peace, the introduction of the committees of the village
poor (
 
kombedy
 
) in the countryside, and granting courts the right to mete out the
death penalty.
What unfolded next is yet to be explained definitively in the historical literature.
Left SRs Ia. G. Bliumkin and N. A. Andreev assassinated the German ambassador,
Count Mirbach, on July 6 in the hope of undermining the Brest-Litovsk peace. Left
SRs who for a short time controlled the Cheka headquarters in the capital sent
cables to the provinces explaining the partys motivation for the assassination and
criticizing the treaty with Germany. The Bolsheviks interpreted the murder and
related events as a conspiracy against Soviet powerwhich it was in one sense
and took advantage of the situation to decapitate the Left SR Party. Although the
documentation can be decoded in various ways, the Bolshevik response should
come as no surprise, given the partys fixation with conspiracy and the anti-
Bolshevik uprising, probably unrelated, which broke out in Yaroslavl the same
day.
 
15
 
Study of the reaction in Saratov to the Mirbach murder does not shed much light
on the historiographical controversy surrounding the event, but it does demonstrate
serious factionalism within the Left SR Party leadership and considerable hostility
toward its Central Committee. It also challenges Brovkins conclusion that all
over Russia the Left SRs [...] were arrested and expelled from the local Soviets.
 
16
 
At an emergency meeting about forty Left SRs protested against their partys
Central Committee in Moscow, while local Bolshevik leaders expressed their belief
that the Saratov Left SRs would remain loyal to Soviet power. After heated debate,
the Saratov Left SR organization carried a resolution distancing itself from the
tactics of the partys Central Committee and calling for a national party council
(
 
sovet
 
) to be held in Saratov on July 21.
A resolution passed on July 9 at a citywide Left SR Party conference states
unambiguously that whatever the intentions of their Moscow comrades, the
 
15. Most historians accept the notion of an uprising, while a few historians (namely G. Katkov,
Iu. Felshtinskii, and Vladimir Brovkin) argue that the Bolsheviks had actually conspired
against the Left SRs. Calling for a reassessment, Lutz Hafner convincingly shows there is no
hard evidence to back the Bolshevik conspiracy charge. On the other hand, he maintains that
the Bolsheviks consciously and quite successfully aimed to split and thereby destroy the Left
SR Party. See his The assassination of Count Mirbach and the July uprising of the Left
Socialist Revolutionaries in Moscow, 1918, 
 
Russian Review, 
 
50, 3 (1991): 324-344 (quote
found on 340). Michael Melancon also argues that the Left SRs did not plan a coup, but merely
wanted to end the peace with Germany. See his The Left SRs, July 1918-1919: Dissolution
and survival, unpublished paper presented at the 25th national meeting of the AAASS,
November 1993.
16. V. N. Brovkin, 
 
Behind the front lines...
 
, 
 
op. cit.:
 
 20.
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uprising against the ruling party had turned into one against Soviet power.
 
17
 
 The
resolution proclaims that the local organization would have judged its Central
Committee even more harshly if it had not been for the deep certainty that their
stupid heroism had its source in an incorrect assessment of real facts and was the
most egregious tactical mistake of a group of the most selfless revolutionaries.
Arguing that the Central Committees tactics since March logically had to end
with an uprising against the very government, it called for deepening the class
struggle and forging a united front with the Bolsheviks. Saratov Left SRs reiterated
their call for an all-Russian conference and their desire to take part in Soviet
institutions.
 
18
 
 
Articles written by Rudakov, Chernyi, Sapozhnikov, and Ustinov in preparation
of the Saratov conference backed the working out of a new political tactic based
on the principle of class struggle, seeking to save the party which did not die and
cannot die. The authors rejected individual acts of terror, emphatically denying
that the entire party bore responsibility for the actions of its Central Committee,
which is far removed from local party organizations. Denouncing the party
Central Committee, Sapozhnikov underscored the rift between it and the locales.
The essays assert that the heroic-romantic period in the history of revolutionary
socialism had given way to a practical need to govern. They accent the primacy of
the class struggle in a united front with the Bolsheviks against the enemies of Soviet
power for the triumph of the social revolution.
 
19
 
 
Another collection of essays put out by Saratov Left SRs in connection with the
conference repeats the same harsh judgments of the Central Committee, but also
some cautious language suggesting that not all the facts surrounding the July events
were known. Lamenting the loss of their friendly critics on the left, whom they
had betrayed at the most difficult and dangerous moment of the class struggle, the
authors admitted the party was crawling on all fours. The self-congratulatory
(and self-promoting) document notes that the Saratov organization, the first to
sound the alarm [against the Central Committee], promoted the slogan the class
struggle by way of a united front with the Bolsheviks against all enemies [...] of
Soviet Russia in the name of the triumph of the social revolution.
 
20
 
 Yet while
condemning Mirbachs murder as a counterrevolutionary act, Rudakov stressed
that without complete information it was impossible to say what drove the partys
 
17. Saratov Left SRs did not know whether the Left SRs had decided at their Third Party
Congress to rise up against Soviet power or whether the uprising was a response to the Fifth
Congress of Soviets decision to fire on Left SRs who had revolted against Soviet power at the
front. For the Saratov Soviets discussion of the matter see V. P. Antonov-Saratovskii, ed.,
 
Saratovskii Sovet rabochikh deputatov, 1917-1918: Sbornik dokumentov 
 
(Moscow and
Leningrad, 1931): 575-583.
18. Partiia levykh sotsialistov-revoliutsionerov (internatsionalistov), 
 
Materialy k Vserossiiskoi
konferentsii Partii levykh s.r. (internatsionalistov) v g. Saratove (Iiul, 1918 g.)
 
 (Saratov,
1918): 3-6.
19. 
 
Ibid.: 
 
7-21.
20. Partiia levykh sotsialistov-revoliutsionerov, 
 
Vokrug moskovskikh iiulskikh sobytii,
 
 
 
op.
cit.:
 
 3.
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Central Committee to rise up against the ruling party.
 
21
 
 Emphasizing the need to
resolve the crisis peacefully, he stated that local Left SRs must morally support
their Central Committee, even if it had made a mistake. Insofar as the majority of
local committees 
 
opposed
 
 the Central Committee, the Bolsheviks were forcing an
artificial split.
 
22
 
 Ustinov suggested that those who criticized the party for wagging
like the Bolsheviks tail may actually have prompted leaders to show the partys
real face, which 
 
did 
 
separate it from the Bolsheviks 
 
and
 
 the Right SRs. More
importantand this point has bearing on later developmentshe reminded his
comrades that the Bolsheviks 
 
had
 
 fallen under Left SR influence in recognizing
the possibility of constructing socialism in a backward country [...] the socialization
of land, and the vanguard role of a minority that took the initiative, etc.
 
23
 
 Ustinov
also dismissed the notion that Russia could launch an uprising against the world
bourgeoisie, not only because of the psychological weariness of the masses, but
also because events in Russia had little impact outside the country. It must be
understood, finally, that the 
 
salvation
 
 of our revolution is not in an 
 
uprising
 
, not in a
 
breathing spell
 
, but in the 
 
international social revolution
 
.
 
24
 
 
Denying that their actions represented a schismatic act or one of
insubordination, twenty delegates representing thirteen Left SR organizations
assembled in Saratov on July 21, 1918, where the majority condemned Mirbachs
murder and reiterated the need to convene a national congress to set up a new
party.
 
25
 
 The defenders of the partys Central Committee at the Saratov conference
largely represented provincial organizations, whereas delegates from 
 
uezd
 
 centers
in the same provinces voted for a radical change in the tactics of the party and in its
attitude toward Soviet practical work.
 
26
 
 
The events surrounding the murder of Count Mirbach sundered the Left SR
Party as the Bolsheviks expressed their desire to continue working only with those
Left SRs who condemned their Central Committees policies. As the view took
hold that the Left SRs had risen up unsuccessfully against Soviet power, an
enormous number of Left SRs joined the Bolsheviks, suggesting the importance
of the Bolsheviks ability to control the dominant political discourse. While some
radical populists continued calling themselves Left SRs, two new parties emerged
as well, the Revolutionary Communists (
 
Revoliutsionnye kommunisty
 
), who
participated in the ruling coalition until October 1920, and the Popular Communists
(
 
Narodniki-Kommunisty
 
), who had already merged with the Communist Party by
 
21. 
 
Ibid.: 
 
5-6.
22. 
 
Ibid.:
 
 34-38.
23. 
 
Ibid.:
 
 8-9.
24. 
 
Ibid.:
 
 30-33; 
 
Znamia revoliutsii
 
, 3, 95 (Nov. 7, 1918): 4.
25. A development greeted warmly, incidentally, by V. I. Lenin. See 
 
Polnoe sobranie
sochinenii
 
 (hereafter 
 
PSS
 
) (Moscow, 1963), vol. 37: 35-36, and M. Sagradian, 
 
art. cit.
 
: 109.
Shestak claims that eighteen organizations sent representatives to Saratov. See Iu. I. Shestak,
 
Bolsheviki i levye techeniia..., op. cit.: 
 
33.
26. Partiia levykh sotsialistov-revoliutsionerov, 
 
Vokrug moskovskikh iiulskikh sobytii, op.
cit.: 43.
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November 1918.27 Saratovs Ustinov and A. L. Kolegaev emerged as the most
forceful spokesmen of the Revolutionary Communists, although the latter soon
joined the Communist Party. While the two men did not see eye to eye on all
tactical matters, they had nothing good to say about the Left SR Central Committee.
This is particularly true of Ustinov, who emphasized that the Left SRs withdrawal
from the Fifth Congress represented a traitorous provocation of agents of the
bourgeoisie,  which demonstrated that the Left SRs were henceforth enemies of
the majority of representatives of the workers and peasants. He denounced Central
Committee members as a group of madmen-intelligenti, thirsting for success
among the petite-bourgeoisie, middle-class urban dwellers, and village kulaks
[who] rose up against the dictatorship of workers and the poorest peasants and won
for themselves the most enthusiastic sympathy from all those who support the
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.28 
Breaking tactically with the Left SRs, former party members founded the
Revolutionary Communist Party in Moscow on September 25-27, 1918. Their
organ, Volia truda, disavowed the use of force to undermine the Brest peace; acts of
terrorism by Soviet parties; open struggle with the ruling Communist Party in order
to seize power by force; and any policies that weakened, in the masses view, the
class character of the revolution, which, through civil war will lead to socialism.
The Central Committee selected at the congress included a number of
Saratovites, including Ustinov and Chernyi.29 
If initially leaders of the new party felt compelled to renounce any links between
it and the former Left SRs,30 they soon seemed comfortable admitting this heritage.
By mid-October Saratov RCs began clarifying their revolutionary past. As they
saw things, the deepening rift between the class of toilers and the bourgeoisie had
driven all those not committed to the class struggle into the counterrevolutionary
27. Formed in September 1918, the Popular Communists rejected Left SR tactics while
adhering to populist tradition. They, too, accepted Soviet power, but unlike the Revolutionary
Communists, they saw the committees of the village poor as organs of the revolutionary class
war in the countryside. The partys main leaders, G. D. Zaks, Oborin, and others, declared that
all Soviet parties have one programthe building of Communismand one tacticclass
struggle. See K. V. Gusev, Krakh partii levykh eserov, op. cit.: 226, 256.
28. G. Ustinov, Krushenie partii levykh es-erov (Moscow, 1918): 6-7, 11-12, 16-18, 21-22.
Ustinov initially took a stance similar to that of the Popular Communists in regard to the
kombedy. But this attitude was not shared by other party members, who condemned the
committees.
29. K. V. Gusev, Krakh partii levykh eserov, op. cit.: 226; resolutions from the congress are
found in Znamia revoliutsii, 1, 93 (Oct. 21, 1918): 3-4; Iu. I. Shestak, RKP(b) i partiia
revoliutsionnogo kommunizma, Voprosy istorii KPSS, 2 (1972): 20; and Rossiiskii tsentr
khraneniia i izucheniia dokumentov noveishei istorii (hereafter RTsKhIDNI), f. 282, op. 2, d. 3,
ll. 2-5 ob. The Central Committee also included A. Ustinov, V. Chernyi, G. Maksimov,
A. Kolegaev, A. Bitsenko, A. Aleksandrov, and M. Dobrokhotov. 
30. Recoiling when RCs in Volsk referred to themselves as former Left SRs, the Saratov RC
committee emphasized that the Revolutionary Communists had changed their tactics and
fleshed out its program to such an extent that all ties with the Left SR Party are completely
severed. Tsentr dokumentatsii noveishei istorii Saratovskoi oblasti (hereafter TsDNISO),
f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 18, l. 6.
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camp.31 This division had fractured the Left SR Party, whose revolutionary wing
that recognized the legacy of Chernyshevskii, Lavrov, and Mikhailovskii had
become the Revolutionary Communists. Apart from them, only the Bolsheviks
understood the class nature of the social revolution that had engulfed Russia. The
RCs emphasized, however, that it was not through the dictatorship of the proletariat
but through the dictatorship of all toiling elements that socialism would be built in
Russia.32
With the power of the toilers to socialism!
The first issues of the Saratov Revolutionary Communists newspaper, Znamia
revoliutsii, had some explaining to do. We are Communists, that is, we are moving
toward socialism, through concrete forms of the communization of the economy.
And we are revolutionaries [...] in a programmatic-tactical sense, insofar as we
have promoted and promote [...] the creative role of personality, the role of the
revolutionary minority [that shows] initiative in history. More to the point: not
through the dictatorship of the proletariat, but through the dictatorship of all toiling
elements, united in a single class of labor will socialism be brought to Russia.33
With the power of the toilers to socialism! (Vlastiu trudiashchikhsia  k
sotsializmu).
Those familiar with Russian populism will recognize its legacy in the RCs
emphasis on the individual (rather than the collective), on developing all facets of a
person (rather than accenting economic considerations), on local initiative (rather
than centralization), on the revolutionary potential of the toiling masses (rather than
of the industrial proletariat). But the specifics were often murky. Although party
leaders disagreed over how to effect economic transformation in the countryside,
they advocated the socialization, not nationalization, of land, which must belong to
those who work it, and under no circumstances to the state.34 Seeking to establish a
mass party, the RCs appealed to morally righteous people to join them. Sensitive to
the partys own crystallization from the Left SRswhich involved vocal
opposition to the Central Committeethe RCs called for strict party discipline and
compliance with all directives issued by congresses and party committees.35
The Revolutionary Communists tactics can best be summed up as the
application of radical populist principles and doctrine to ever changing civil war
conditions without undermining the alliance with the Communist Party. Dividing
31. See, for instance, the no. 89, Sept. 20, 1918, issue of Znamia revoliutsii. Interestingly, the
Revolutionary Communists later put out a paper with the same name. 
32. TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 15, ll. 8-11.
33. Znamia revoliutsii, 1, 93 (Oct. 21, 1918): 1.
34. M. V. Spirina, Krakh melkoburzhuaznoi kontseptsii..., op. cit.: 174-176, 184; RTsKhIDNI,
f. 282, op. 2, d. 3, ll. 57-57 ob.
35. TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 14, l. 1.
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society into two groups, the toilers and those who exploited them, the RCs version
of the heroic present maintained that foreign and domestic considerations
determined their policies. The former included the breakup of the world economy
owing to the imperialist war, the growing onslaught of world imperialism against
Soviet Russia and the worldwide workers-peasants movement, and the
developing social revolution that would rupture imperialism from within. The most
important domestic considerations determining Revolutionary Communist policies
were economic collapse resulting from the war and the old order, the outbreak of
civil war (the inevitable companion of social revolution, which in turn is
deepening economic ruin), and the constellation of social forces in the country. In
this transition period Revolutionary Communist theorists saw the role of parties
as chiefly ideological: to harness the creative power of the toiling masses and to
broaden the dictatorship of the proletariat.36 Party literature emphasized the fact
that social revolution had broken out in peasant Russia, and that the Bolsheviks
wrongly sought to build a new socialist economy without taking the peasant
majority into consideration.37 Walking a fine line between criticizing specific
Bolshevik policies and supporting Soviet power, the RCs felt compelled to reiterate
their commitment to Soviet power and to a united front with the Bolsheviks.
Reconfirming that they would never permit any sort of uprising against the
existing power of the soviets and that they were ready to combat those who tried,
Saratov RCs denounced the Left SRs and stressed the need for a united front with
the Bolsheviks. Down with all imperialist robbers and brigands! Death to all
parasites and usurpers of the toiling masses! Long live the united revolutionary
front!38
With the benefit of hindsight it appears that the Revolutionary Communists
understanding of the social dynamics of the revolution involved them in a
discursive struggle with the Communists in which the populists were on the
defensive from the very start. The events of October 1917 had underscored the
central role of the proletariat and even of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But the
RCs held that the narrow dictatorship had significance only during the period of the
seizure of power and destruction of the bourgeois state apparatus, and that a
dictatorship of all toiling elements was essential for building a new order.
Confident of their ability to compete with the Bolsheviks on these grounds (recall
Ustinovs conviction that the Bolsheviks belief that socialism could be constructed
in peasant Russia had a populist origin) the Revolutionary Communists held that
they could convince the Bolsheviks to change their tactics, or alter their policies.
The preponderance of Russias peasant population gave the RCs their self-
assurance.
36. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 14, ll. 3, 4 ob.
37. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 3, d. 1, l. 13.
38. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 8, l. 11. At the same time the party chided those who not seeing
any farther than their noses blamed the Bolsheviks for food supply shortages. See, for
example, Znamia revoliutsii, 2, 94 (Oct. 28 (Nov.1), 1918): 2-3.
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Indeed, Saratov Bolsheviks moved gingerly in introducing committees of the
village poor, which a Volga-Urals regional RC Party conference at the end of 1918
condemned. Lamenting that the dictatorship of the proletariat is becoming a
dictatorship of the Bolshevik Party, the RCs claimed that the Bolsheviks clumsy
efforts at socializing the economy was creating a form of state socialism that
excluded elements of the toiling population, that is, most peasants. Delegates called
for uniting all revolution-minded elements of the population to bring about change
in union with the Bolsheviks, thus preventing broad segments of the toiling masses
from rising up against the Bolsheviks and thereby against Soviet power. Although
this stance exacerbated relations between the two parties at the local level, the
Communist Partys subsequent decision to disband the kombedy convinced the RCs
that they and other revolution-minded elements of the population could get the
Bolsheviks to alter their policies and co-opt those of the populists.
The Revolutionary Communists commitment to Soviet power prompted them
to perceive otherwise questionable Bolshevik practices as the consequences of
temporary circumstances brought about by civil war. For example, they recognized
the need for the centralization of Russian political life in this transition period
characterized by a life-and-death struggle with the Whites. Moreover, at their Third
Congress in April 1919, the RCs rejected cooperation with the Mensheviks and
SRs, affirming that the Bolsheviks represented the major fighting force of the
social revolution.39 When Saratov fell under siege in early July, the chair of the
provincial RC committee, Sapozhnikov, instructed all party members to join forces
with the Bolsheviks, to refrain from carrying out any independent policies,
particularly in regard to the Communists detested grain policies, in order to create
a united front to defend Soviet power. In case of disagreements with Bolsheviks at
the local level, he instructed RCs to investigate the matter and disband the [party]
organizations. Issue appropriate appeals in view of the threatening danger.
Mobilize all local organizations.40
This is not to say that the Revolutionary Communists lost sight of their goals or
their constituency. Resolutions carried by the First Conference (sovet) of the
Revolutionary Communist Party held in Saratov that difficult summer underscore
the significant withdrawal of the laboring masses from politics and from the
soviets brought about by the Communists attempts to introduce a party dictatorship
in conditions of overall economic ruin and class war. Although the RCs welcomed
the new political course adopted by the Communists after their Eighth Congress in
March 1919 (regarding the middle peasant, whom the party now embraced, and the
39. Iu. I. Shestak, Bolsheviki i levye techeniia..., op. cit.: 23-24.
40. TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 49, l. 25. Sapozhnikovs telegram is found in Ibid., d. 98, l. 3;
similar telegrams earmarked for specific uezd committees are found in f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 56,
ll. 12-17, and in op. 1, d. 52, ll. 7-8. Interestingly enough, the Volsk Bolshevik committee
agreed to compromise with the RCs, but under no circumstances to accept minority
representative status. See TsDNISO, f. 27, op. 1, d. 236, l. 12. At roughly the same time, the
Third Party Congress of the RC Party called upon all organizations to send responsible
members to the Eastern front. However, the party took advantage of the situation to criticize
changes that had come to the Red Army. See TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 46, ll. 4, 5.
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introduction of the Soviet Constitution), the RCs believed the changes could not
attract the laboring peasantry, who until now remained almost without political
leadership, which the Revolutionary Communist Party must provide. The anti-
Bolshevik mood that had spontaneously flared up in Russia threatened the revolution
and deepened the apolitical feelings of significant strata of laborers susceptible to the
forces of counterrevolution, spreading hopes that to topple Soviet power would put
an end to war and hunger. Reaffirming their commitment to class struggle and to a
united revolutionary front with the ruling party, the RCs believed they must organize
the peasantry and strengthen the authority of the soviets of toiling workers and
peasants in order to create a stable revolutionary-socialist majority. The Saratov RC
organization likewise went on record that the struggle between the two approaches
to socialist construction (Marxism and populism) must not permit battles between
the two political parties. But the Revolutionary Communists fully intended to
propagate their ideas and strengthen their influence over the masses, inviting all
populist groups and parties that shared its program and tactics to join them in building
a new order, thereby leaving the door open to merger. 41 And it was this above all else
that made the Bolsheviks leery of their allies. 
The Revolutionary Communists maintained their backing of Soviet power,
however, appealing to the toiling masses to work together to smash world
capitalism. A resolution on tactics passed in September 1919 noted that the
disagreement between the two methods of socialist construction could only be
resolved by the organic evolution of new socioeconomic forms. It reiterated the
refrain that only revolutionary populism represented all the toiling masses. It
opposed the Communist Partys centralization of the socialization process,
juxtaposing it to the RCs concern with satisfying ones striving for [developing]
personality and total emancipation. But the RCs endorsed the principle of lasting
support for the Bolsheviks: we support them despite their methods of constructing
[socialism], we support them, for the main task of the moment is the battle against
capitalism. In spite of the peasantrys natural desire to undermine the
Bolsheviks rural program, the RCs must turn their attention to the more urgent
need to overthrow capitalism. Party regulations approved at this time declared that
the proletariat and toiling peasantry were equal players in the revolutionary drama.
The party called upon all members to take part in Soviet work and to strengthen the
Red Army, all the while maintaining friendly relations with the Bolsheviks.42
Until the very end of their independent existence the Revolutionary
Communists continued to question the viability of specific Bolshevik strategies.
However, as in the past, the RCs did not waver in their commitment to Soviet power
or in their willingness to subordinate their party to the Bolsheviks when they felt the
revolution was at stake. For example, in 1920 the Revolutionary Communists
spoke out against the efficacy of a policy known as labor conscription. Yet
Saratovs Sapozhnikov, in a sincere if desperate attempt to make sense of it,
41. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 9, ll. 1-2 ob.
42. Ibid, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 42, ll. 7-8, 10-11, 19, 22-24; op. 1, d. 44, ll. 12, 17. 
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eventually saw the temporary necessity of labor armies, labor conscription, and
coercion.43 Similarly, in early 1920 the RCs promoted the organization of a
production union of workers of the land (proizvodstvennyi soiuz rabotnikov zemli)
in order to bring about socialism by means of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
The guidelines called for uniting all workers regardless of their political or
religious convictions. While the details remain vague, it appears that the RCs
sought to equalize peasant land holding and set up a correct product exchange
between town and country. The unequal commodity exchange, that is, grain
requisitioning, continued to alienate the peasantry as the military skirmishes of the
Civil War drew to a close. The movement met with particular success in Volsk
uezd. Even though the unions organizers emphasized their support for the
Communists and Soviet power, the Cheka arrested those who set them up.44 The
police did so because the unions seemed all too similar to the SRs Union of Toiling
Peasants (Soiuz trudovogo krestianstva) to be discussed later in this essay, whose
purpose was to overthrow Communist-Bolshevik power.45 And, in fact, rank-
and-file RCs do not appear always to have appreciated the difference. The local
Cheka reported that the peasant unions supported Soviet power in Saratov uezd, but
not in the other districts.46 Under fire, the RCs Central Committee instructed all
party members to stop organizing new unions until the disagreement with the
Bolsheviks was resolved.
Co-optation amid repression: Relations with the Bolsheviks
In some district towns in Saratov provinceKamyshin, Atkarsk, Nikolaevsk,
Serdobsk (and nearby Rtishchevo)the Moscow events of mid-summer 1918
impaired relations between Left SRs and Bolsheviks, despite the conciliatory tone
the Saratov Left SRs had taken. Bolshevik leaders in the locales were often
outsiders, sent by Moscow or Saratov to bolster Soviet power, and they now had
grounds to clash with the influential Left SRs. For example, in Kamyshin
Mirbachs murder caused a rupture between Left SRs and Bolsheviks, the result of
a long-smoldering feud. In Kuznetsk where the Bolsheviks had campaigned hard
against the Left SRs, uezd congresses brought in Left SR majorities, forcing the
Communists to invite them to take part in the local executive committee.47
43. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 85, ll. 15-22. See also Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Saratovskoi oblasti
(GASO), f. 3310, op. 1, d. 1, l. 137.
44. The unions regulations are found in TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 3, d. 16, l. l5. Information on
Volsk is found in Ibid., l. 1, and in d. 15, l. 34-34 ob.
45. GASO, f. 521, op. 5, d. 11, ll. 13, 24; RTsKhIDNI, f. 282, op. 1, d. 47, l. 33; Marc Jansen,
The Socialist-Revolutionary Party after October 1917: Documents from the S.-R. archives
(Amsterdam, 1989): 548.
46. GASO, f. 3310, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 124 ob-125.
47. Znamia revoliutsii, 1, 93 (Oct. 21, 1918): 4. The example of Kamyshin is found in
Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GA RF), f. 393, op. 3, d. 333, ll. 19 ob-20.
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The Soviet government did not formally legalize the Revolutionary Communist
Party until February 28, 1919. This delay gave local Communists considerable
latitude in dealing with the RCsas well as with the other parties. The Saratov
province Communist Party organization agreed to work with the RC Party when it
was founded in the fall of 1918, but to criticize its program.48 Local Communists
could afford to be generous, for some Saratov Revolutionary Communists
publicly announced their withdrawal from the party and joined the Bolsheviks.49
Moreover, in addressing the Saratov Soviet, whose meetings he sometimes co-
chaired, Sapozhnikov continued to distance the party from the Left SRs.50 Be that
as it may, tension colored the Saratov RCs relations with the Bolsheviks. Balashov
Bolsheviks ridiculed the new partys name, but at first did not interfere with its
activities. In Volsk the RC organization lacked representation in the executive
committee despite the partys popularity. Although the Commissariat of Land was
in the hands of the Bolsheviks, all of its members are former Left SRs and their
land policies do not differ from ours at all, claimed one RC, who added, In Volsk
almost all of the workers are on our side. In Kuznetsk the local Bolshevik
organization cooperated with the RCs until the arrival of a group from Moscow
who with all their might want to wipe us from the face of the earth. They
prevented the RCs from working in the villages, confiscated their equipment, and
blocked them from taking part in a congress of the village poor.51
At this particular point during the Civil War there is little evidence of subtle
Foucauldian co-optation, and plenty of evidence of coercion. Relations between the
two parties rapidly deteriorated at years end as disagreements flared up over
representation at the Fourth Congress of Peasant Deputies of Saratov Province held
in December 1918,52 and then as elections took place to village and volost  soviets
in early 1919. Moscows recall of the influential Bolshevik leaders V. P. Antonov
(Saratovskii) and M. I. Vasilev (Iuzhin) who had worked closely with
Sapozhnikov may also have exacerbated tensions. Balashov Bolsheviks disbanded
the RC organization in early 1919, inviting its members to join the Communist
Party.53 The Atkarsk Bolsheviks declared the local RC organization illegal, arrested
the partys uezd committee, prevented the party from holding meetings in rural
areas, and interfered in elections to rural sovietsresorting to intimidation, armed
force, and arrestall in violation of the Soviet constitution. They justified
excluding RCs from a local congress of soviets in February by claiming that the
48. GA RF, f. 393, op. 3, d. 327, l. 103. 
49. Znamia revoliutsii, 1, 93 (Oct. 21, 1918): 2.
50. GASO, f. 456, op. 1, d. 16, ll. 30-30 ob. See also V. P. Antonov-Saratovskii, ed., Saratovskii
Sovet..., op. cit.: 724.
51. Znamia revoliutsii, 4, 96 (Nov. 29, 1918): 4. 
52. M. Sagradian, art. cit.: 117.
53. Sapozhnikov spoke out eloquently in Antonov and Vasilevs defense. See GA RF, f. 1235,
op. 93, d. 496, ll. 156-58. Izvestiia Balashovskogo Ispolnitelnogo komiteta, 17 (Jan. 25, 1919):
4.
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RCs everywhere opposed organization of the kombedy and backed the unity of the
entire peasantry.54 Finally, they informed both the Bolshevik provincial committee
and the Central Committee in Moscow that they considered the Revolutionary
Communists illegal because the overwhelming majority of their organizations
represent kulak elements.55 A resolution carried at the Third Uezd Congress of
Revolutionary Communists in February 1919 complained that the Bolsheviks often
prevented the RCs from meeting and that force was used during recent elections in
the villages.56 Other RC reports from the localities read like indictments against
the Bolsheviks, for RC activists viewed them as a dirty riffraff, as political
speculators seeking above all to avoid being packed off to the front.57 
The Communist Party adopted a new spirit of accommodation during the thaw
following the November 1918 revolution in Germany, which changed how it
related to the RCs and other socialist parties. To be sure, local considerations,
mainly the approach of the Whites, played a role as well. Admitting numerous cases
of Bolshevik repression against RCs, the All-Russian Soviet Executive Committee
in February 1919 declared the RCs a Soviet party.58 At the Eighth Party Congress
in March 1919 the Bolsheviks softened their dictatorship of the proletariat by
openly courting the middle peasantry (recognizing the power of the toiling
people (vlast trudiashchikhsia)). In early April the Central Committee of the RC
Party asked Moscow to investigate abuses of power in Atkarsk and the use of force
in elections to village soviets.59 Following a visit to Atkarsk of Central Committee
agent I. P. Flerovskii60 in May, Saratov Bolsheviks agreed to let Revolutionary
Communists take part in local government, thereby ending the period of merciless
coercion.61 The timing says a good deal about the motivations of both parties:
Denikins troops moving against Saratov would have eagerly hanged the members
of either. Moreover, a classified report reveals how disdained SovietBolshevik
power was in the countryside. When White armies approached Balashov and
Atkarsk, local Communists had to go into hiding for fear of reprisals. Volost and
54. TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 52, ll. 2-5, 16-17; f. 151/95, op. 2, d. 4, l. 8; op. 2, d. 16, ll. 12-
13; op. 2, d. 41, ll. 2-3. See Krasnaia kommuna, 150 (Feb. 28, 1919): 3-4; Krasnaia gazeta, 301
(March 6, 1919): 2, and GASO, f. 521, op. 6, d. 1, l. 116. The Bolshevik paper also suggests
relations between the party and the RCs in Atkarsk were strained. See Krasnaia kommuna, 80
(Nov. 29, 1918): 4.
55. TsDNISO, f. 27, op. 1, d. 227, l. 9; M. Sagradian, art. cit.: 119.
56. TsDNISO, f. 200, op. 1, d. 90, ll. 1-1 ob.
57. Ibid., f. 200, op. 1, d. 90, l. 8.
58. RTsKhIDNI, f. 282, op. 2, d. 3, ll. 22-23. For Lenins views see PSS, vol. 41, 56-57 and vol.
50, 120. The legalization decree is found in Dekrety Sovetskoi vlasti (Moscow, 1958) IV: 451-
452.
59. TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 48, ll. 17-20. See also RTsKhIDNI, f. 282, op. 1, d. 66, ll. 5-6
ob and d. 1, l. 31.
60. (1888-1959). A former member of the Kronstadt Soviet and a delegate to the Bolshevik
Sixth Party Congress, Flerovskii became a member of the Saratov Gubkom and Gubispolkom
in June 1919.
61. GASO, f. 456, op. 1, ed. khr. 48, l. 103; TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 48, l. 12.
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village soviets ignored decrees of the Soviet government and, in some volosti in
Balashov, openly supported Denikin. The report admits that without the assistance
of a well-armed detachment to combat desertion, the party would have lost the
villages. While the document criticizes the Revolutionary Communists opposition
to Bolshevik agrarian policy, it notes that the partys provincial committee
habitually affirmed its loyalty to Soviet power.62 And it did: The partys leadership
instructed local members, even those who complained about Bolshevik repression,
to cooperate with Lenins party during such trying times.63 As a result, some local
Communists highly valued their populist allies.64 
An agreement reached between the two party committees in Saratov in May
1919 allowed the Revolutionary Communists to carry out party work in the villages
and garrison, and to participate in soviets and their executive committees at all
levels. RCs and Bolsheviks would collaborate in sending out agitators to the
districts, and the Bolshevik Party would fund RC Party work and publications.
Periodically, the two parties would hold joint meetings. Revolutionary
Communists would also report any subversive activities to the Cheka.65 Yet the
sources disprove the assessment of Soviet historian Iu. Shestak, who claims that
Bolsheviks in the provinces showed the utmost in good will in establishing
relations with Revolutionary Communist organizations, and in fact, as Suslov
argues, the initiative to normalize and improve relations always came from the
RCs.66 The document Saratov Bolshevik leader Ivanov circulated to his associates
in the locales regarding the arrangement stressed the need to work with the RCs
because they were a legal party. But Ivanov cautioned his fellow Bolsheviks to be
vigilant, for the petit-bourgeois (i.e., peasant) nature of the party would
eventually reveal itself in a manner similar to that of the earlier uprising of the Left
SRs.67 Bolshevik organizations in Volsk and Atkarsk soon invited the RCs to join
the provincial and city executive committees; however, some local Bolsheviks
ignored the new line, even during the dangerous days of summer.68 For example,
the Volsk Bolshevik organization announced that it considered legalization [of
62. GASO, f. 521, op. 3, d. 15, ll. 8-9.
63. See, for example, TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 55, l. 87.
64. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 3, d. 1, l. 12.
65. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 50, l. 6; d. 77, l. 16. The Saratov Bolshevik Committee was split
over the matter of collaborating with the Revolutionary Communists, but the majority
eventually recognized the need for joint work in the countryside. See M. Sagradian, art. cit.:
112-11 3.
66. Iu. I. Shestak, Bolsheviki i levye techeniia..., op. cit.: 24 (quote) and 40-41; Iu. P. Suslov,
Sotsialisticheskie partii ..., op. cit.: 42. 
67. M. Sagradian, art. cit.: 111.
68. TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 3, d. 4, l. 1. See Atkarsk RC leader Tataevs reply to the bilious
letter sent by local Bolsheviks who ironically claimed that they had once again bent over
backward to accommodate the RCs, TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 2, d. 8, l. 5 Volsk RCs issued a
joint statement with local Bolsheviks that admitted Soviet powers mistakes. See Rabochii i
krestianin, 146 (July 3, 1919): 2.
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the RCs] possible in principle.69 Be that as it may, the RCs still had difficulty in
organizing cells, thanks to the unwillingness of local Bolsheviks to carry out the
policies of the Center.70 A Balashov Bolshevik reported to the Central Committee
that the partys new conciliatory policy in relation to the middle peasants bred
confusion and evoked disbelief. Admitting the hold SR Maximalists and peasant
Bolsheviks (RCs) had over the peasants, especially in Turki and the villages of
Ivanovka and Alekseevka, he expressed doubts about the decision reached at the
Eighth Congress. The local peasantry also expressed doubts: the peasants in the
uezd dont believe the Communists and dont respect them.71
Even during the heyday of cooperation, it was not unusual for the Bolshevik
press to portray the RCs as a party of kulaks opposed to Soviet policies.72 And, in
fact, RC activists in the villages opposed to Bolshevik practices often sided with the
peasantry against the latter. Local Bolsheviks complained that RCs stirred up the
peasantry against Soviet power by promoting the slogans, Down with the
Bolsheviks! Long live Soviet power! Confidential Revolutionary Communist
sources admit that the partys rural cells often comprised kulak and White Guard
elements; in other words, the peasantry saw the party as populist and therefore in
support of its interests, which they could not reconcile with Bolshevik policies. The
Volsk RC organization declared that it had the right to disband cells in the event
they comprise kulak and White Guard elements, and that even though the mood
in the uezd favored party work, two things hampered it: fear of arrest owing to
Bolshevik opposition to the party, and the fear of having kulak and White Guard
elements predominate in their organizations.73 The RCs concern over arrest must
not be dismissed.74 All in all, the elliptical evidence suggests a rift between the RC
leaders in Saratov (and uezd towns) and party activists in the villages, whose
origins can be found in the partys opposition to the kombedy and to the food
brigades that frequented the area in the second half of 1918.
Despite (as a result of?) the agreement reached in the spring of 1919 with the
Bolsheviks, which enabled the RCs to carry out work in the villages, cooperation
with the Bolsheviks began to break down as soon as the threat posed by the Whites
receded,75 especially in those uezdy where local Bolshevik leaders took pride in
their revolutionary pedigree. For example, Petrovsks Neibakh seemed especially
69. TsDNISO, f. 27, op. 1, d. 236, l. 3. 
70. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 3, d. 1, l. 3.
71. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 53, l. 6. The Union of SR Maximalists was active in town in early
1919. See Izvestiia Balashovskogo Ispolnitelnogo komiteta, 22 (Jan. 31, 1919): 4.
72. GASO, f. 521, op. 3, d. 15, ll. 8-9. This remained true of the press well into 1920. See, for
example, Rabochii i krestianin (Volsk), 66 (March 25, 1920): 2.
73. TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 70, l. 1.
74. See Izvestiia Atkarskogo uispolkoma, 234 (June 26, 1919): 4; TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 3, d.
5, ll. 14-15; op. 2, d. 42, l. 18. Some peasants were sympathetic to the RCs because there were
fewer scoundrels among them. See op. 1, d. 71, l. 2.
75. TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 42, ll. 1-4. Also in Znamia revoliutsii, 2 (Sept. 30, 1919): 3.
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determined to rid his uezd of counterrevolutionary RC influence. To get his way,
he interfered in local elections.76 During the second half of 1919 the Revolutionary
Communists denounced the Communists efforts to curb the partys representation
at local congresses.77 At a provincial congress of soviets in September 1919, the RCs
complained the Bolsheviks did everything possible to cut down our representation
to a minimum, including the reelection of [...] delegations [...] and the calling of
emergency uezd congresses of soviets. The RCs protested the Bolsheviks
selection and promotion of non-party deputies, who were organized into a
separate fraction at the congress (the tactic backfired on the Bolsheviks since they
were unable to control the non-party representatives who turned out to be Right
SRs.) Resolutions proposed by the RCs critical of centralization and of the
governments food supply policies were voted down. The Bolsheviks also denied
the RCs request for proportional representation in the newly elected provincial
executive committee, offering the party only two places. Guided by the interests of
the revolution [...] our fraction was forced to accept this, lamented one RC leader.78
When the Saratov RC organization held its second provincial congress in
September 1919, delegates from the villages and district centers expressed concern
over the Saratov city committees unequivocal support for the Communists. Local
reports observed a rise in the partys fortunes and its growing popularity among the
masses, but also emphasized a cautious and malevolent attitude from the
Bolsheviks, who placed obstacles in the partys way. Moreover, delegates assailed
the policy of non-partisanship in the villages, which gives negative results, for it
brings together the very worst elements of the villages and hinders the development
of our class-oriented populist ideas.
The Revolutionary Communists sought to extract a price for their commitment
to Soviet power, at times exaggerating the extent of Bolshevik antipathy.79 In
Atkarsk in June 1919 they demanded almost half the seats in the presidium selected
at an uezd congress. This happened in Novouzensk uezd in September, and in
Petrovsk later in the year.80 Further, whenever the RC position was fortified, the
party took up the peasant question, the real source of conflict with the Bolsheviks.
At an uezd congress of soviets in Volsk at the end of 1919, Revolutionary
Communists blasted out against Bolshevik land policies and called upon the RC
Party to carry out independent work within the land department to end the use of
force against the peasants. They also denounced several Bolshevik candidates
nominated to the Volsk executive committee, while RC delegates from the villages
called for the election of members who would seize the Bolsheviks by the
throat.81 Fearing the RCs demands to raise fixed prices for grain would
76. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 52, ll. 91-93; op. 1, d. 50, l. 31.
77. See, for example, the complaint found in Znamia revoliutsii, 1 (Sept. 5, 1919): 1.
78. TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 43, ll. 7, 60. See also Znamia revoliutsii, 2 (Sept. 30, 1919): 4.
79. RTsKhIDNI, f. 282, op. 1, d. 45, l. 10.
80. TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 52, ll. 66-70, 91-99. 
81. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 53, l. 12.
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undermine the states bread campaign, local Bolsheviks attacked the RCs with
great hostility.82
In late 1919 and early 1920 a new period of repression against the RCs set in,
perhaps owing to the growing factionalism within the Bolshevik Party so much in
evidence at the Ninth Party Congress in March-April 1920, and to the confidence
that came with victory over the Whites. The Saratov RC committee demanded
explanations from the Cheka regarding the arrests of party members in certain
locales.83 Relations soured in Serdobsk over the RCs disagreements with
Bolshevik economic policies.84 Bolsheviks in Ivanovskaia volost, Balashov uezd,
disbanded the executive committee, seized its money, and arrested its members.
During the episode the head of the police raped the wife of a local RC leader.
Peasants also bitterly complained to the Cheka about the brutality of special Red
Army units under the command of a certain Cheremukhin that were sent to pacify
the countryside. The Volsk RC committee contended that in 1920 terror had
been unleashed against them as reports of illegal arrests emanated from the
countryside. Atkarsk RCs also protested an array of transgressions. 85 
 Even though reports flowed in from the rural areas of serious disagreements
between the Bolsheviks and RCs, the latters leaders continued to back Soviet
power. The mood in the villages had again turned against Bolshevik policies, owing
to military conscription and the enlisting of civilians for compulsory labor, but RC
leaders called upon local party members not to take advantage of this to strengthen
their own position, and instead to explain to the peasantry why it was in their own
best interests to work for the Soviet cause. Maintaining that the only way out of the
situation was the joining together of both Soviet parties, the RC organization
favored a rapprochement (sblizhenie) within the toiling population, satisfying its
greatest needs, quick socialization of land and a struggle against the caprice of
local and central agents.86
The extent of the Revolutionary Communists influence
As suggested, the Communist Partys backing away from its extremeand
ineffectualpolicies in the villages (particularly in regard to the kombedy) and
Saratovs falling under siege in the summer of 1919 gave the Revolutionary
Communists the opportunity to function legally as a Soviet party, but not without
undue harassment. Soon Revolutionary Communist Party organizations appeared
82. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 91, l. 2; Iu. P. Suslov, Sotsialisticheskie partii ..., op. cit.: 78.
83. See TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 55, ll. 16, 94. In Balakovo RCs were arrested, allegedly
for counterrevolutionary activities. See Ibid., f. 1328, op. 1, d. 43, l. 1.
84. Serp i molot, 98, 382 (May 15, 1920): 2.
85. RTsKhIDNI, f. 282, op. 2, d. 12, ll. 24 ob-26; d. 21, l. 15; TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 2, d. 42,
l. 9; op. 3, d. 15, ll. 11, 22.
86. TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 3, d. 14, l. 12.
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everywhere radical populist elements traditionally had been found in Saratov
province. Soviet historians argue that outside Saratov it was rare to encounter
strong RC groups at the uezd level such as those that existed in Atkarsk, Balashov,
Volsk, Pugachevsk, and Serdobsk districts. New research, however, might serve to
revise this impression.87 Moreover, the Revolutionary Communists had a great deal
in common with the Borotbists (Borotbisty), the Ukrainian Left SRs.88 In any
event, before May 1919 there were about thirty-three local RC organizations and
cells throughout Saratov province and an active uezd committee existed in Atkarsk.
After the change in political climate, however, uezd committees formed in Saratov,
Volsk, Petrovsk, and Serdobsk; thirty-six new party cells and organizations were
set up, and individual party members carried out work in the districts.89 When
Saratov fell under siege in late summer 1919, party organizations existed in five
uezdy and RCs could be found in four uezd executive committees and in two of
their presidiums. In addition, the party set up an oblast bureau joining party
organizations in nine neighboring provinces. The bureau was revived in the spring
of 1920.90
Unfortunately, the sources do not reveal how strong the Revolutionary
Communists were numerically. Party enrolments remained in flux; frequent
mobilizations depleted local committees; and, as noted, local party cells bitterly
protested Bolshevik repression, often refusing to provide information about
themselves. Shestak claims that party organizations existed in fifteen provinces at
the end of 1918 with 4,300 members and sympathizers and that 1,625 remained in
the party at the time of its collapse in 1920.91 Writing on Saratov province,
Sagradian adduces figures that raise serious suspicions. According to him, the
Saratov city RC organization had only 93 members in 1918 and 300 members and
sympathizers in 1919.92 My count of the number of members/sympathizers in the
87. RC organizations functioned in Astrakhan, Gorokhovets, Voronezh, Kineshma, Kazan,
Kaluga, Peremyshev, Kiev, Kostroma, Lvov, Moscow, Minsk, Penza, Kerensk, Petrograd,
Doldino station, Saratov, Atkarsk, Balashov,Volsk, Simbirsk, Smolensk, Iukhnov, Viazma,
Krasnyi Kut, Pugachevsk, Tambov, Tver, Rzhev, Torzhsk, Mendelinsk, Iaroslavl, Uglich,
and Urzhum. See TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 21, l. 1-1 ob. This list is not comprehensive.
See, for example, M. Sagradian, art. cit.: 110.
88. The Borotbists also remained allies of the Ukrainian Communists until the former merged
with the latter in March 1920. Like the RCs, the Borotbists disagreed with the Bolsheviks over
the peasant question and the leading role of the proletariat in the revolutionary process. The
Borotbists support of Ukrainian nationalism drove another wedge between them and the
Leninists. See Jurij Borys, Political parties in the Ukraine,in Taras Hunczak, ed.,The
Ukraine, 1917-1921: A study in Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1977): 135-140, and Ivan
Maistrenko, Borotbism: A chapter in the history of Ukrainian Communism, trans. by George S.
N. Luckyj with the assistance of Ivan L. Rudnytsky (New York, 1954).
89. Znamia revoliutsii, 2 ( Sept. 30, 1919): 3.
90. RTsKhIDNI, f. 282, op. 1, d. 45, ll. 30-30 ob.
91. Iu. I. Shestak, Bolsheviki i levye techeniia..., op. cit.: 33; M. V. Spirina, Krakh
melkoburzhuaznoi kontseptsii..., op. cit.: 202. These figures suspiciously ignore 1919, when
party strength reached its peak. They also seem low when the incomplete figures for Saratov are
considered. 
92. M. Sagradian, art. cit.: 110.
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Volsk and Atkarsk organizations in 1918 comes to 355 and 758 respectively.93 In
late 1919 there were 1,432 party members and sympathizers in five districts of
Saratov province. Suslov has recently challenged the notion that membership had
begun to decline already in the second half of 1919, arguing that the party could still
dictate its policies in these uezdy.94 
Who joined the party? At the national level, 77% of the partys membership
consisted of peasants, and 11%, workers. Former Left SRs made up the partys
national leadership. Peasants enrolling in the party described themselves as middle
or poor peasants, or, more often, simply did not differentiate at all. But military
service among party members was almost universal, suggesting the extent to which
the party comprised younger males and to which military service served as a school
for radicalism.95 Data on the composition of the Saratov city RC organization
indicate it would be a distortion to describe the RCs merely as an offshoot of the
Left SRs (although this appears to have been the case in the districts). Among the
members of the Saratov committee were 12 (former) SRs, 14 Left SRs, 16 SDs
(presumably Bolsheviks), 13 Mensheviks, 4 anarchists, 6 SD internationalists, and
20 foreigners. Later, 25% of the Saratov organization were workers, 40% were
peasants, and 35% were members of the intelligentsia.96 
The partys strength remained in the districts, where it played its greatest role in
1919. At the end of the year, three RCs took part in the Atkarsk district executive
committee (and three in Serdobsk, four in Balashov, and five in Kuznetsk). They
also fared well in elections to congresses of soviets in some uezdy.97 The sources
indicate that new members continued to join the party and new cells formed (and
collapsed) throughout the partys existence, well into 1920. Information from 1920
about Lopukhovskaia volost, Atkarsk uezd, admittedly a non-representative
volost, lists 50 Bolsheviks, 45 Bolshevik sympathizers, 118 RCs, and 610 RC
sympathizers.98 As of February 1, 1920, there were twenty-three active party cells
in Atkarsk uezd with about 100 members and 700 sympathizers. Eight of the cells
had been founded in 1918, eight in 1919, and seven in 1920. The oldest were the
largest.99 New cells appeared in Volsk villages in 1920 as well.100 While the RCs
may not have represented a serious force at the national level, a confidential
93. TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 35, ll. 1-53.
94. RTsKhIDNI, f. 282, d. 2, ll. 72-73, 84, 90-91; Iu. P. Suslov, Sotsialisticheskie partii ..., op.
cit.: 38, 79.
95. These figures are found in Iu. I. Shestak, Bolsheviki i levye techeniia..., op. cit.: 21, and the
information on military service in TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 2, d. 22.
96. TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 34, ll. 1-27.
97. M. Sagradian, art. cit.: 113; the archives contain individual petitions to join the party in
1918 and 1919, but there is no way of knowing how many petitions of this sort were actually
written. See, for example, TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 61; op. 1, d. 97. 
98. TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 2, d. 40, l. 3.
99. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 102, l. 1.
100. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 97, l. 7.
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report from mid-1920 admits their strength in Saratov province, especially in
Saratov, Atkarsk, Volsk, and elsewhere.101
The Revolutionary Communists in Atkarsk
The Revolutionary Communists enjoyed their greatest support in Atkarsk district,
which, in spite of its proximity to Saratov, lacked a healthy Bolshevik Party
organization until late summer 1918, when a group of Ukrainian activists arrived in
Atkarsk. Fearing the Ukrainians departure would result in a serious blow to local
activities, owing to the strength of anti-Communist sentiments within the uezd, the
Atkarsk Bolsheviks lobbied to keep the outsiders there after their recall by
Moscow.102 In view of their vulnerability, local Bolsheviks prevented any RCs
from entering the presidium of an uezd congress of soviets in November 1918, even
though they made up 20% of the delegates.103 At the time, local Bolsheviks carried
a resolution in support of Red Terror, articulating a version of the revolution,
according to which only the Communist Party, which had made the October
Revolution, represented a true revolutionary force in the country.104
In early 1919 the partys internal language, the language of classified and
confidential reports that were not intended for mass consumption, underscored a
variety of problems that beset the Atkarsk Bolshevik organization, ranging from
economic collapse and disorganization to anti-Soviet feelings among individuals
working for the local soviet.105 Further, rumors circulated in Elansk that Red Army
units had risen up against the Communists.106 As we have seen, the Atkarsk
Bolshevik organization declared the RC Party organization illegal, but the latter
reacted bitterly, taking its case to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. In
what must have been unfavorable circumstances, the RCs succeeded in sending 24
party members and 64 sympathizers to a district congress in March 1919, attended
by 96 Bolshevik delegates and 101 sympathizers.107 When Denikins forces had
placed the province under siege and the Communists sought accommodation with
101. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 83, ll. 2-3.
102. Ibid., f. 200, op. 1, d. 4, ll. 26, 50; op. 1, d. 19, l. 32. A report on the establishment of a party
cell in Balanda shows how volatile political attitudes were at this time; roughly 25% of those
constituting the cell had to be expelled for not being Communists. See f. 200, op. 1, d. 12, l. 27.
103. Ibid., f. 151/95, d. 32, l. 3. The Atkarsk newspaper claims that RCs carried out agitation
against the Bolsheviks and took part in local uprisings. 
104. Ibid., f. 200, op. 1, d. 2, ll. 1-2.
105. Ibid., f. 200, op. 1, d. 82, ll. 2-2 ob, 7; op. 1, d. 42, l. 5. 
106. Ibid., f. 200, op. 1, d. 56, l. 18. According to the rumors, F. K. Mironov had issued an
appeal to the local population to fight against the Communists.
107. Ibid., f. 200, op. 1, d. 92, l. 1. At this conference the Bolsheviks said that the RCs inflicted
traitorous stabs in the back of the revolution by opposing the kombedy and promoting the
union of all peasants. See V. P. Antonov-Saratovskii, Sovety v epokhu voennogo
kommunizma: Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow, 1929), pt. II: 424-425.
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the peasant Bolsheviks, the RCs fared better at local congresses. A congress in
June drew 83 Communists/sympathizers and 53 RCs/sympathizers. The figures for
September 1919 were 55 and 37 respectively.108 However, the RCs most likely
were underrepresented: the local organization boasted 800 members already in
1918, approximately the size of the Bolshevik organization a year later.109
Other sources confirm the revival in Revolutionary Communist Party fortunes,
but also that the Atkarsk Bolsheviks once again adopted a hard line toward their
populist rivals.110 An Atkarsk Bolshevik in August 1919 insisted the RCs were
nothing more and nothing less than a blockhead with eyes. Emphasizing the RCs
lack of ideas, he acknowledged that the party is needed by us until it fulfills all
of our orders. When it stops fulfilling them, well throw them out on their ears.111
In September the Atkarsk RC committee informed Saratov that relations with the
Bolsheviks were becoming worse and worse, in part owing to the Revolutionary
Communists uncovering of abuses in the local soviets department of social
services.112 Writing to its Central Committee, the RCs protested the mean-spirited
behavior of the dishonest local Bolsheviks, their arbitrary policies in the
countryside, and the arrest of party members purportedly for no reason at all.113 In
November the RCs refused to reveal the location of its party cells in the countryside
or to tell how many members the party had. Bolshevik insistence that their request
was for informational purposes fell on deaf ears.114 Moreover, the two parties
clashed over representation at another congress of soviets,115 when Bolsheviks
ignored calls for proportional representation.116 While local Bolsheviks accused the
RCs of seeking to undermine their authority,117 the RC uezd committee complained
to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee that persecution [...] is constant.
It insisted that the Cheka had prevented it from forming an armed band when
Denikins forces threatened the district, that elections to the village and volost
soviets had been carried out under dubious circumstances, that local Bolsheviks
attacked them in the press and sought to limit their support at local congresses, and
108. Izvestiia Atkarskogo Ispolnitelnogo komiteta, 238 (July 1, 1919): 3; 297 (Sept. 10, 1919):
3.
109. That is, after party week. TsDNISO, f. 200, op. 1, d. 43, l. 23.
110. Ibid., f. 200, op. 1, d. 45, l. 111; f. 27, op. 1, d. 18, l. 31.
111. Ibid., f. 27, op. 1, d. 227, l. 45.
112. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 48, l. 14; RTsKhIDNI, f. 282, op. 2, d. 12, l. 21. See also ll. 24 ob-
26.
113. GA RF, f. 9591, op. 1, d. 67 (the entire delo); TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 2, d. 4, l. 48.
114. RTsKhIDNI, f. 282, op. 2, d. 21, l. 16; TsDNISO, f. 200, op. 1, d. 87, l. 14. The RCs had
issued a circular to local activists to form party cells, but not of whole villages. See TsDNISO,
f. 151/95, op. 2, d. 30, l. 35.
115. TsDNISO, f. 200, op. 1, d. 45, l. 103.
116. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 2, d. 30, ll. 4-4 ob, 10.
117. Izvestiia Atkarskogo Ispolnitelnogo komiteta, 369 (Dec. 7, 1919): 3.
THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNISTS, SARATOV, 1918-1920 649
that the local Cheka turned a blind eye to corruption, instead focusing its attention
on attacking the Revolutionary Communists.118
Repression undoubtedly accounts for the RCs poor showing at local congresses
at the start of 1920, when their central committee formally complained to the All-
Russian Executive Committee about the Atkarsk Chekas capricious encroachment
upon the RCs.119 In connection with serious threats to Soviet power and the
Bolsheviks need to compromise once again in mid-1920, the RCs fortunes
improved significantly; it now accounted for a full third of the members of the local
executive committee. Its deputies constituted 19 of the 44 sent from the uezd for a
provincial congress of soviets in Saratov, which the RCs P. S. Sapozhnikov
chaired.120 
With the brilliant victories of the Red Army, there was widespread belief
among RCs that a period of peaceful development would begin, which would
enable them to influence Bolshevik policies in the villages.121 But conflict between
the two parties continued. Complaints were lodged regarding police harassment
and Bolshevik attempts to discredit the RCs as counterrevolutionary and even
criminal elements.122 In August 1920 RCs demanded the Bolsheviks provide
proof for their accusations that the RCs plotted to overthrow Soviet power,
organized kulak elements in the countryside, and participated in other traitorous
behavior.123 Expressing their total support for Soviet power, Atkarsk RCs
denounced the repression, insisting that they were not about to break with their
tactics and merge with other populist groups.124 
The weakness of the Bolshevik Party in Atkarsk undoubtedly accounts for its
hostility toward the Revolutionary Communists. If on paper the Atkarsk
Communist Party organization continued to grow during 1920 (by spring
registering 111 cells with 2,267 members and 64 sympathizers), real problems lay
behind the statistics. A report described work in the countryside as very poor.
Local Communists functioned without coordination, while personal rivalries and
lack of consciousness obstructed the activities of the uezd committee. Finally,
there were many paper Communists in the district; peasants who had enrolled in
local organizations often quit the party after they had a chance to study its
program.125 A party conference in May admitted that the peasantrys attitudes
118. TsDNISO, f. 27, op. 1, d. 634, ll. 103-4.
119. Ibid., f. 27, op. 1, d. 635, l. 18.
120. Izvestiia Atkarskogo Soveta, 30 (Feb. 10, 1920): 1; Izvestiia Atkarskogo Ispolnitelnogo
komiteta, 240 (July 3, 1920): 4.
121. RTsKhIDNI, f. 282, op. 2, d. 25, ll. 10-10 ob.
122. For example, see TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 2, d. 41, l. 5; op. 2, d. 31, l. 3; op. 2, d. 32, l. 69;
f. 200, op. 1, d. 204, ll. 8-9; f. 27, op. 1, d. 635, l. 1; RTsKhIDNI, f. 282, op. 1, d. 1, l. 32 ob;
d. 66, ll. 4, 8.
123. TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 2, d. 33, l. 24.
124. RTsKhIDNI, f. 282, op. 2, d. 46, ll. 8-9.
125. TsDNISO, f. 200, op. 1, d. 126, ll. 1, 2 ob, 3.
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toward Soviet power were not particularly good, owing to its food supply
policies, grain requisitions, and relentless mobilizations of manpower, resources
and supplies.126 The newly elected uezdkom began functioning in conditions of
complete breakdown of Soviet institutions and party organizations.127
The grim prospects might well have driven the two party organizations into each
others arms, for by May 1920 relations showed some sign of improvement. RC
propaganda now harshly criticized the SRs and Mensheviks.128 At an uezd
conference of the RC Party held at the end of October 1920, stormy applause met a
report by an activist named Tataev on the national conference of Revolutionary
Communists, which had resolved to join with the Bolsheviks into a single all-
Russian Communist Party.129 Yet this did little to fortify Soviet power locally. A
year later Tataev, now a Communist, gave the closing words at an uezd conference,
which noted widespread apathy within the districts Communist Party organization
and that many of those working in Soviet institutions did so merely to obtain food
rations.130 
Problems from within
Serious problems beset the Revolutionary Communist Party from the onset, which
had much to do with a confused identity and with serious disagreement over how to
reconcile pronounced support for Soviet power with the peasantrys open hostility
to Bolshevik policies. Two months after Left SR renegades formed the
Revolutionary Communist Party, five members of its Central Committee withdrew
from the body to join the Communists. The other left populist party formed at the
time, the Popular Communists, merged with the Bolsheviks. Saratov RCs
responded by insisting the party must continue to exist until it convinced the
Bolsheviks to accept the entire class of toiling peasantry as an active participant in
the building of socialism. This sentiment more than anything else helps us
understand the character of the party in Saratov province.131 Expressing faith in the
ultimate union of all left socialist groups, it rejected the actions of the Central
Committee members who had abandoned the party.132 But at the local level, too,
126. Ibid., f. 200, op. 1, d. 126, ll. 6-6 ob.
127. Ibid., f. 200, op. 1, d. 135, l. 2.
128. RTsKhIDNI, f. 282, op. 2, d. 25, l. 19; d. 24, l. 15.
129. TsDNISO, f. 200, op. 1, d. 126, l. 37.
130. Ibid., f. 200, op. 1, d. 279, ll. 25-32.
131. It also reveals a sentiment so prevalent among Left SR leaders known as Golgofism, that
is, that they were fated to be martyrs to the revolutionary cause.
132. TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 32, l. 1. Those who quit were A. A. Aleksandrov, A.
Bitsenko, M. Dobrokhodov, A. Kolegaev, and V. Chernyi.
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some of the partys founding members switched allegiance to the Bolsheviks.133
RCs continued to withdraw from the party, usually to become Bolsheviks, until the
party merged with the Communist Party at the end of 1920. As a legal party, the
RCs were also liable for frequent mobilizations; during the summer of 1919
participation in such campaigns depleted the partys ranks and resulted in the
collapse of local groups.134 Moreover, the existence of two parties whose official
names contained the word Communist bred so much confusion in Saratov
province that some local Communists began calling themselves Bolsheviks once
again.135
Other problems that plagued the RCs were similar to those hampering the
Bolsheviks. For example, the RC Central Committee acknowledged that party
members ignored instructions, often claiming lack of time because of their
involvement in soviet work, while others disregarded summons by the Red
Army.136 Party members also refused to participate in village and volost soviets,
observing that there was no one to tend their fields.137 Others were accused of
various abuses, such as hiding deserters.138 The RCs likewise suffered from a
decentralized organizational structure, which enabled local leaders to interpret
general policies as they saw fit. The Bolshevik V. A. Radus-Zenkovich observed
strains within the local RC leadership and a decline in Sapozhnikovs authority.139 
The partys success during the second half of 1919 along with the Bolsheviks
vulnerability promoted dialogue among radical populist groups and parties
regarding merger. Four of the nine members of the RC Partys Central Committee
who backed the union of all revolutionary socialist populist parties into a new party,
the Revolutionary Socialist Party, were expelled from the committee.140 Ustinov
vehemently opposed union, arguing that a new party of this sort would turn into a
133. Two of the three RC representatives on the Atkarsk executive committee joined the
Bolsheviks in December 1918 and voted to remove the remaining RC from the committee. GA
RF, f. 393, op. 3, d. 330, l. 57. For another discussion of problems within the party in late 1918
see TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 17, l. 8.
134. See, for instance, TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 98, ll. 4-4 ob.
135. M. Sagradian, art. cit.: 121.
136. TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 49, l. 47; op. 3, d. 4, l. 39. See also RTsKhIDNI, f. 282, op.
2, d. 3, l. 78. Violations of party discipline was the most frequently cited cause for expulsion
from the Saratov RC Party organization in 1919 and 1920 (followed by promoting Left SR
tactics, anti-socialist behavior, and desertion from the front). TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 108,
l. 1.
137. For example, see TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 2, d. 33, l. 19; op. 2, d. 33, l. 3. One report
denounces a sympathizer who announced he would join the party in order to avoid soviet
work. TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 93, l. 7.
138. TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 2, d. 32, l. 54.
139. V. P. Antonov-Saratovskii, Sovety v epokhu voennogo kommunizma..., op. cit.:, II: 46-
47. See also TsDNISO, f. 27, op. 1, d. 491, l. 149.
140. Among those opposed to merger were Ustinov, Kovalskaia, and Andreev. TsDNISO, f.
151/95, op. 1, d. 67, l. 2. Apparently, an attempt had been made before this to take advantage of
the absence of one Central Committee member to force the issue of union. See TsDNISO, f.
151/95, op. 1, d. 47, l. 5, also RTsKhIDNI, f. 282, op. 2, d. 3, l. 94.
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third, anti-Bolshevik force. Insisting that the revolutions development would
compel other populist groups eventually to adopt the RCs program, the party
eschewed any compromise platform in order to preserve the class and revolutionary
nature of its program and draw others to it.141 At the Revolutionary Communist
Partys Fourth Congress in October 1919, the majority of delegates shot down
proposals to unite with other populists, but only after some protested that force had
been used to prevent delegates from attending who supported an anti-Ustinov, pro-
merger point of view.142 Following the congress, the Central Committee minority
informed all party organizations that a founding congress of the Revolutionary
Socialist Populist Party had been held in Moscow, that the Central Committee of
the Left SR-Internationalists recently released from prison had joined the
organizational bureau, and that the Narod (People) group expelled by the Right SRs
was also considering joining.143 Although most local organizations opposed union,
the Moscow committee as well as one in nearby Penza province backed the idea. In
Saratov, RCs in Volsk reiterated that only the Bolsheviks and RCs represented real
revolutionary parties, and they called for setting up an intra-party bureau on the
basis of equal representation. (The Volsk newspaper was soon renamed Rabochii i
krestianin (Worker and Peasant) to reflect the spirit of hoped-for cooperation.)
Atkarsk RCs likewise stated that they shared common ideals with the
Bolsheviks.144 Ironically, the RCs treated their fellow populists the way the
Bolsheviks dealt with the Revolutionary Communists. At the same time, the very
fact that discussions about merger were held makes clear why local Communists
feared the Revolutionary Communists might one day link with other populist
groups.
The merger that eventually came was of an altogether different sort, for serious
ruptures within the party surfaced at its Fifth Party Congress in the spring of 1920.
Struggling to sort out the historical process as it unfolded, the RCs Sapozhnikov
and Ustinov now took giant steps toward acknowledging the Bolsheviks narrative
of the revolution. The partys acceptance of the authority of the Third Communist
International, and the Bolshevik victory over the Whites, provided the context that
compelled both theorists to break with some long-held populist principles. In his
April Thesis, undoubtedly named after Lenins famous theses of April 1917,
Sapozhnikov admitted the leading role of the proletariat in relation to other social
groups. Drawing on the writings of nineteenth-century populist theorists, he tried to
explain why social revolution had taken place in backward Russia. In answering
the question, he convinced himself that the dictatorship of the proletariat had
evolved logically, that opposition to it was reactionary, and that it would eventually
establish a dictatorship of all toilers. Similarly, Ustinov came to accept the
141. TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 47, l. 11. Some RCs supported the idea of the partys
merging with other left populist groups. See op. 1, d. 60, l. 1.
142. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 47, l. 9 (V. Bazel, V. Zitt, G. Maksimov, E. Semenovskaia).
143. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 67, l. 9.
144. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 3, d. 4, l. 34, (for Atkarsk), op. 2, d. 32, l. 16. 
THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNISTS, SARATOV, 1918-1920 653
historical necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Rejecting potential
criticism that he had abandoned the populist world view in exchange for that of the
Marxists, he maintained there was no longer a need for loyal opposition parties.
Arguing as he had before that the proletarian state could serve as the basis for the
eventual implementation of the populist ideal, he called upon his critics to put an
end to their beliefs (now prejudices), which history had shown to be wrong.145
Disbanding the congress despite the wishes of the majority, the party Central
Committee clearly stood at a crossroads.146
Given the Central Committees stand during the Fifth Congress, subsequent
developments come as no surprise. The Second Comintern Congress in July 1920
ruled that only one Communist Party in each country could be represented in the
Comintern. Attending the congress, Ustinov and Sapozhnikov declared their
Central Committees readiness to subordinate the party to the decisions of the
Communist International. The partys Central Committee then issued a secret
declaration to the Comintern. Calling Revolutionary Communism the Communist
wing of revolutionary populism, it stated the partys willingness to march in a
single revolutionary front with the Bolsheviks. It also spelled out the
disagreements, based on theoretical differences, that had prevented union in the
past, including the nature of the historical process, the character of the class
struggle, the class basis of the socialist revolution, and the organization of power.147
The Sixth Congress of the Revolutionary Communist Party in late September 1920
resolved to merge with the Bolsheviks, and in October Izvestiia reported that
individual members of the RC Party were enrolling in the Communists ranks.
Watching over these developments, the Cheka had promoted the rift that had been
growing within the RC Party in regard to merger.148
As suggested, in seeing the writing on the wall, Saratov RC leaders such as
Sapozhnikov had sought to rationalize the movement toward merger by drawing on
the partys intellectual heritage. Once the decision had been taken to form a united
Communist Party, local organizations complied. The Balashov uezd organization
disbanded, observing that no real work had been carried out in 1920, except in a few
locales. Village cells formed earlier in the year apparently had done so on an
erroneous premise, believing the party was one that opposed the Bolsheviks, and
not one that backed a revolutionary front with them.149 The Saratov uezd
organization discussed and accepted the Comintern decision at a congress in mid-
September 1920, after which 18 of the organizations 160 members joined the
145. M. V. Spirina, Krakh melkoburzhuaznoi kontseptsii..., op. cit.: 196-200; Iu. I. Shestak,
Bolsheviki i levye techeniia..., op. cit.: 28.
146. TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 102, l. 7. Nevertheless, an attempt was made to revive the
Volga area party committee, first formed in 1918, which had subsequently disbanded.
Representatives from Saratov, Astrakhan, Tsaritsyn, the Urals, Penza, Tambov, Simbirsk,
Samara, and Kazan took part in these deliberations. TsDNISO, f. 151/95, op. 3, d. 13, l. 12.
147. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 87, l. 29; f. 200, op. 1, d. 90, l. 33.
148. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 83, ll. 2-3.
149. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 1, d. 110, ll. 1, 3.
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Communists.150 The chair of the Atkarsk RC committee remarked that owing to the
strained relations with the Bolsheviks, the RCs had no choice but to merge. He
hoped it would curb the arbitrariness of local officials and improve Soviet rule.
Others justified their behavior by insisting they had no time to think of personal
convictions when there was such a need to struggle with the world bourgeoisie.151 
Conclusion
Although Soviet power in Saratov province might have collapsed at several critical
junctures had it not been for the Revolutionary Communists support, the party is
virtually unknown in the West and in Russia, where its role had been distorted. The
opening of Russian archives makes it possible to restore the party to the historical
record, to illuminate its relationship with the Bolshevik Party, and to study the
reasons for the partys ultimate decline in 1920, a development that has great
symbolic importance, for merger with the Bolsheviks foretold a bleak future for
Russias other socialist parties and for a multi-party system in general.
A political phenomenon of provincial Russia, the RCs emerged from the
influential Left SR Party and, like their predecessors, they made their greatest
contribution at the uezd level. Strongest in those districts with a history of peasant
unrest and violence, the RCs drew on a radical populist tradition in the making
since the turn of the century. In contrast, Bolshevism tended to be a transplanted
political force in the majority of district towns, where there were few industrial
workers. Formed by renegade Left SRs who rejected their Central Committees
attempt to undermine the controversial Brest-Litovsk Peace, the Revolutionary
Communist Party drew its support from the district towns which, in contrast with
Saratov, tended to favor signing the treaty in the spring of 1918. Soviet power was
established in these towns and from there spread to the surrounding countryside
owing to the popularity of the Left SRs and to the implementation of what in effect
was the SR land program. Cooperation within the radical left bloc reached its high
point in the first half of 1918 and the revolutionary solidarity expressed at this time
undoubtedly helps explain the RC Partys sustained commitment to Soviet power,
even when policies of the latter eroded the RCs own popularity among the
peasantry. Moreover, the Communist Partys tactical shifts in regard to the middle
peasantry after the Eighth Party Congress, and its need to fortify its alliance with
other radical groups as White forces moved against the Russian heartland, breathed
a second wind into this radical alliance whose foundation had otherwise been
shaken. The sources do not permit a confident assessment of the partys numerical
strength, but they do document its broad influence.
150. Ibid., f. 151/95, op. 3, d. 13, l. 18; Materialy k 9-i uezdnoi konferentsii (Balashov, 1921):
6.
151. RTsKhIDNI, f. 282, op. 1, d. 47, ll. 23-23 ob; d. 23, ll. 1, 5, 6.
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Indeed, based on this investigation of the Revolutionary Communists in Saratov
province, it is hard to accept the assessment that the party was little and exercised
no political influence.152 To repeat, I argue that the partys sustained commitment to
Soviet power proved a decisive factor in keeping the province from falling to the
Whites as a result of a rejection of Soviet power from within. Above all, this
observation holds true for mid-1919, when Saratov came closest to shaking off
Bolshevik power.153 Although critical of specific Bolshevik policies, the RCs did not
back away from their conviction that all other considerations had to be subordinated to
the survival of Soviet power. This tactical stance held sway over most party members,
making Bolshevik policies more or less acceptable, especially when their brunt was
softened by local activists and rank-and-file party members, or conveniently ignored
when necessary or when possible. Committed to social revolution and under the spell
of vague images of a utopian future, RC leaders prided themselves in their partys
revolutionary pedigree and acceptance of revolutionary change.
The RCs did not cooperate with the Bolsheviks merely because they wanted to
save their party from collapse, but because they believed that they ultimately could
persuade the Bolsheviks to change their ways. As a result, the Revolutionary
Communist Party fought to preserve and strengthen its influence over the
peasantryand thereby over the Communists. But the Bolshevik attitude toward
the other socialist parties reflected the overall strength of Soviet power at any given
time; the evidence adduced here reinforces Anweilers assertion that in crises the
loyalty or conditional support of these groups was valued, but when danger
diminished, they were ignored.154 Thus, each partner brought an element of
insincerity into the relationship, and this is especially true of the Communists. The
Communists used the Revolutionary Communists, but it was not without some
acquiescence on the part of the populists.
Why did the Revolutionary Communist Party ultimately merge with the
Bolsheviks? As we have seen, populist critics had lashed out at the RC Party from
the start. Moreover, the other off-shoot of the Left SRs  the Popular
Communists  as early as November 1918 merged with the Communists; SR
Maximalists did the same in April 1920. Defections to the Bolsheviks, as well as to
the right, undermined the RCs too. In time, a rift formed between party leaders in
Saratov and those at the district and village level who had to make a case to the
disgruntled peasantry for unpopular policies. RC cadres in the villages frequently
took the peasants side (Soviet Power without Bolsheviks), giving some credence
to the Bolsheviks claim that the party included hostile elements, and less to
Schapiros that by refraining from any criticism of communist practices, the
Revolutionary Communists purchased a period of free existence.155 They criticized
152. L. Schapiro, op. cit.: 180, 181.
153. D. J. Raleigh, art. cit.: 340-346.
154. Oskar Anweiler, The Soviets: The Russian workers, peasants, and soldiers councils, 1905-
1921, translated by Ruth Hein (New York, 1974): 231-232.
155. L. Schapiro, op. cit.: 181.
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the Bolsheviks on many counts and as a result the relationship between the two
parties had an inherent tension, the mirror image of which was the need each had for
the other, especially when faced with military threat from White forces.
Lets return to the notion that societies not only predetermine how their subjects
rebel against constraints but also co-opt strategies of dissent, according to its
peculiar requirements. Ironically, and perhaps because the Bolshevik hold on
power remained precarious throughout the Civil War, the process of co-optation
between them and their populist ally remained a two-way street. In seeking to
marginalize and repress this other revolutionary voice, the Bolsheviks found
themselves locked in a dialogue with the very Revolutionary Communist discourse
it sought to discredit. (In some respects it is paradoxical that the word co-optation
assigns negative values, for the success it implies in persuading others is usually
considered desirable.156) From the time of the RCs crystallization from radical
populism, the party saw its main purpose as the need to convince the Communists
to broaden their narrow dictatorship of the proletariat to include all the toiling
masses. The Bolsheviks change of heart in regard to the middle peasants in March
1919 (co-optation of their opponents criticism?) convinced the RCs that they were
beginning to influence their Bolshevik comrades. Yet by the time the military
confrontations associated with the Civil War drew to a close and the Bolshevik
leadership faced the prospects of rebuilding a ravaged country, the Revolutionary
Communists had even less cause to break with the Bolsheviks over measures the
former found disagreeable and the latter claimed were necessitated by
circumstances. The Bolsheviks had fared well in the discursive struggle among
those who remained committed to Soviet power (and at times won over the support
of the mainstream SRs and Mensheviks as well). This is especially true because
some Revolutionary Communists from the start had accepted an important part of
the Bolsheviks version of the revolutionary tale that reified the proletariat, and
now that the Whites had been defeated the Bolshevik version seemed even more
compelling. Those Revolutionary Communists who had a hard time accepting this
backed merger with other populist groups. For the rest of the party members,
merger with the Communists merely exonerated their behavior since mid-summer
1918. In turn, the Bolsheviks absorbed more than individual Revolutionary
Communist Party members in late 1920. Read Lenins speech at the Tenth Party
Congress justifying the introduction of the New Economic Policy and end of grain
requisitioning: his attitude toward the peasantry bears an uncanny resemblance to
the peasant Bolsheviks notion of vlast trudiashchikhsia. 
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